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Managing stakeholder perceptions:  
Organized hypocrisy in CSR disclosures on Facebook 
 
 
Abstract 
This study examines stakeholders’ perceptions of CSR disclosures by exploiting big data about 
the interactions between firms and stakeholders in social media. Given that social media 
represent public arenas where divergent – sometimes conflicting - stakeholder interests are 
present and debated, we draw on organized hypocrisy theory to explore how stakeholders react 
to hypocrisy talk, decisions, and actions strategies employed in CSR disclosures on Facebook. 
We retrieve and analyze S&P100 firms’ Facebook posts and the related stakeholders’ reactions 
for the period starting 24th February 2016 to 2nd March 2017. We find that stakeholders exhibit 
diverse reactions towards firms’ hypocrisy strategies. While stakeholders put more value on 
firms’ actions-related information, and such actions disclosures attract both positive and 
negative reactions, talk and decisions disclosures generate positive reactions and reduce 
negative perceptions. We also investigate how stakeholder reactions trigger firms’ post-
disclosure replies and find that firms engage selectively with stakeholders, avoiding those who 
have concerns or criticism towards firms’ CSR practices. Overall, our findings show that the 
use of organized hypocrisy disclosure strategies in social media allows firms to manage 
stakeholder perceptions and maintain legitimacy.  
 
 
KEYWORDS: CSR disclosure; organized hypocrisy; social media; big data; stakeholder 
perceptions; stakeholder engagement; legitimacy 
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1. Introduction 
The increasing corporate use of social media platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter, to 
disclose CSR information (Zhou, Lei, Wang, Fan, & Wang, 2015) and potentially engage with 
stakeholders (Unerman & Bennett, 2004), offers a novel big data source about how firms 
interact with their relevant publics (Arnaboldi, Busco, & Cuganesan, 2017; Brennan & Merkl-
Davies, 2018; Teoh, 2018). While only 61% of S&P100 firms linked social media accounts to 
their corporate websites in 2012, by the end of 2015, this percentage is up to 95% (Investis, 
2015). Studies on CSR disclosure in social media have started to flourish (Castelló, Etter, & 
Årup Nielsen, 2016; Colleoni, 2013; Gómez-Carrasco, Guillamón-Saorín, & García-Osma, 
2017; Lee, Oh, & Kim, 2013; Manetti & Bellucci, 2016; Saxton, Gomez, Ngoh, Lin, & Dietrich, 
2017), extending research beyond CSR disclosures in annual reports (e.g. Buhr & Freedman, 
2001; Deegan, Rankin, & Tobin, 2002; Guthrie & Parker, 1989; Neu, Warsame, & Pedwell, 
1998), stand-alone sustainability reports (e.g. Cho, Guidry, Hageman, & Patten, 2012a; Islam 
& McPhail, 2011; Mahoney, Thorne, Cecil, & LaGore, 2013; Michelon, Pilonato, & Ricceri, 
2015) and corporate websites (e.g. Cho, Phillips, Hageman, & Patten, 2009; Coupland, 2006; 
Wanderley, Lucian, Farache, & de Sousa Filho, 2008).  
Prior disclosure literature often implicitly assumes that by employing various 
disclosure legitimation strategies (Cho, 2009; Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Lindblom, 1994; 
O’Donovan, 2002), or increasing the level of disclosures (Cho, Michelon, & Patten, 2012b; 
Deegan et al., 2002; Patten, 2002), the perceptions of relevant publics can be managed 
(Lindblom, 1994; Neu et al., 1998). Although prior studies have examined investors’ response 
to corporate financial disclosure strategies in social media (Blankespoor, 2018; Brennan & 
Merkl-Davies, 2018; Cade, 2018), how relevant publics respond to CSR disclosure strategies 
remains relatively under-explored (Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2017). Stakeholder perceptions 
to CSR disclosures are often reflected in stakeholder behavioral (e.g. buying ethical products) 
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or emotional reactions, such as expressing positive or negative sentiments (Suchman, 1995). 
Accordingly, positive stakeholder reactions point towards the maintenance of firm legitimacy, 
while negative reactions could imply that the firm legitimacy is at risk. Large-scale quantitative 
research often uses indirect proxies for legitimacy, such as media exposure (Aerts & Cormier, 
2009), reputation scores (Cho et al., 2012a; Toms, 2002), or legitimacy-threatening events 
(Patten, 1992). In this paper, we examine directly stakeholders’ reactions to CSR disclosure 
strategies, exploiting big data about the interactions between firms and stakeholders in social 
media. Social media are interactive, internet-based applications and include micro-blog sites 
like Twitter, and social networking sites like Facebook (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010). Facebook 
offers an ideal setting for our investigation because it provides firms with a powerful big data 
environment to analyze corporate engagement with stakeholders, i.e. the self-selected 
followers of the company (Bellucci & Manetti, 2017; Gandomi & Haider, 2015), and represents 
a public arena of citizenship where divergent stakeholder interests are present and debated 
(Lehman, 2010; Whelan, Moon, & Grant, 2013).  
The presence of potentially divergent stakeholder interests is key to the choice of our 
theoretical framework. Recent research argues that firms use hypocrisy talk, decisions, and 
actions to manage divergent stakeholder interests and hence maintain legitimacy (Cho, Laine, 
Roberts, & Rodrigue, 2015). Cho et al. (2015) label ‘Talk’ as written or spoken words 
presenting firms’ commitments and policies to interact with the external environment. 
‘Decisions’ are a special type of talk specifically indicating a future intention and an increased 
probability of corresponding actions (Brunsson, 2007). ‘Actions’ represent the execution of 
previous talk and decisions (Brunsson, 1993). Talk, decisions and actions, in turn, contribute 
to erect organizational façades. These façades are symbolic fronts used to manage firms’ 
legitimacy (Abrahamson & Baumard, 2008; Cho et al., 2015). A ‘rational façade’ is erected to 
justify the rationality of decision-making. A ‘progressive façade’ aims to illustrate the 
  5 
organization’s progress towards committed goals, while a ‘reputational façade’ displays the 
organization’s positive images towards stakeholders (Abrahamson & Baumard, 2008). In other 
words, to gain and maintain corporate legitimacy within society, managers “camouflage” 
corporate practices (Michelon, Pilonato, Ricceri, & Roberts, 2016) by using talk strategies with 
one party, decisions strategies with another, and actions strategies with the third (Brunsson, 
1989). In doing so, they build façades which influence stakeholders’ assessment of CSR 
performance in an attempt to positively shape perceptions towards the firm and hence manage 
corporate legitimacy. This framework offers a rich and nuanced theoretical lens to explore how 
stakeholders with potentially divergent interests perceive CSR disclosures and how firms’ 
legitimacy is managed in social media. 
We focus on S&P 100 firms, and using the big data languages Python and R, we retrieve 
and analyze 21,116 Facebook posts and the related stakeholders’ reactions – both in terms of 
emoticons and comments - for the period starting 24th February 2016 to 2nd March 2017. We 
choose this period because on 24th February 2016, in addition to the “Like” reaction, Facebook 
introduced five additional emoticon-reactions: “Love”, “Haha”, “Wow”, “Sad”, and “Angry”. 
The new emoticons allow for multiple emotions in stakeholder reactions and make Facebook, 
potentially, an even more dynamic and interactive system for stakeholder engagement (Saxton 
& Waters, 2014), while also allowing us to capture divergent stakeholder perceptions of 
corporate disclosures. Furthermore, during this period and across the firms included in the 
sample, no major event has put the legitimacy of these firms at risk. Hence, we are able to 
observe the interactions between stakeholders and firms in the process of “ordinary 
accountability” (Bozzolan, Cho, & Michelon, 2015), differentiating our setting from the use of 
social media in reaction to reputational crises (Gómez-Carrasco et al., 2017).  
After controlling for post and firm characteristics, we find that actions disclosures are 
generally associated with greater stakeholder reactions, and they are more likely to attract all 
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types of positive and negative reactions. We interpret such diversified stakeholder reactions as 
reflecting the divergent and sometimes conflicting stakeholder interests that firms are facing. 
Talk disclosures are instead more likely to attract positive reactions, but less likely to receive 
negative ones. Decisions disclosures are more likely to attract positive and some negative 
reactions, but there is no significant association with stakeholder negative comments. These 
results are consistent with the idea that corporate talk and decisions can help firms maintain 
legitimacy by reducing negative perceptions. Although talk and decisions disclosures can help 
manage stakeholder perceptions by mitigating negative reactions, stakeholders still have 
greater reactions towards actions disclosures than talk and decisions disclosures, suggesting 
stakeholders put more values on firms’ actions-related information on CSR issues. However, 
while prior literature suggests that hard, actions-related information should positively affect 
firm legitimacy (Aerts & Cormier, 2009), we find actions disclosures also attract more negative 
reactions than talk and decisions disclosures, implying firm legitimacy is not affected by 
actions information per se, but also by the supply of talk and decisions to meet divergent 
stakeholder interests.  
Since talk, decisions, and actions are used to build organizational façades (Cho et al., 
2015), we additionally explore how the erection of these CSR façades is related to stakeholder 
reactions. We find that reputational façades are more likely to result in positive emotions than 
rational façades, indicating that stakeholders react positively to corporate disclosures that 
promote a positive corporate image. Progressive façades, instead, are more likely than rational 
façades to generate positive reactions, but, at the same time, they are more likely than 
reputational façades to receive negative reactions. This suggests that although firms’ 
disclosures about progress towards committed goals may attract positive stakeholder reactions, 
criticisms on the inadequacy of such progress may still exist.  
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We also explore firms’ replies to stakeholder comments and find that firms are 
engaging with stakeholders selectively. Firms are more likely to reply to positive comments, 
hence reinforcing the employed hypocrisy strategy. However, consistent with the predictions 
of legitimacy theory, firms are more likely to reply in the presence of a high intensity of positive 
emotions, pointing towards a disengagement with stakeholders who have concerns or criticisms 
towards firms’ CSR practices (Gómez-Carrasco et al., 2017; Manetti & Bellucci, 2016). 
Overall, our evidence suggests that – during times of ordinary accountability – the 
interactions between firms and stakeholders on Facebook seem to be positive in nature. 
However, we also document some mixed stakeholder reactions to corporate posts and 
disclosure strategies. In our setting, these mixed reactions are likely to be driven by different 
expectations that various stakeholder groups have about what the firm should be disclosing. 
Although we cannot separate different stakeholder groups in our analysis, we are able to 
document their voices (Gómez-Carrasco & Michelon, 2017) through both positive and negative 
reactions to firm disclosures. We also note that firms’ reply policies are used to reinforce the 
disclosure strategy, rather than mitigating concerns of dissatisfied stakeholders, either because 
instances of outrage and protest are limited, or simply because firms are not using Facebook, 
or social media, to actually engage with stakeholders. Despite the power of social media in 
mobilizing social collective action (Gómez-Carrasco & Michelon, 2017), it appears that during 
periods of “ordinary accountability”, the power between stakeholders and firms is still 
unevenly weighted (West, 2017) and the capacity of stakeholders to ‘tweetjack’ corporations’ 
greenwashing practices needs to be questioned (Lyon & Montgomery, 2013). While surely 
social media represent a change in corporate legitimation processes, it is still unclear whether 
these changes make public interest outcomes more or less likely. We further discuss this 
important implication of our study in the concluding section of the paper. 
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 This study contributes to the literature in several ways. Firstly, our study explores how 
stakeholders perceive the hypocrisy and façade strategies employed in CSR disclosures in a 
social media context, hence extending the findings of Cho et al. (2015). Through the utilization 
of the interactive features on corporate Facebook pages, our study focuses on the dynamics of 
interactions between firms and stakeholders, and reveals insights about the legitimacy-
maintaining process at an individual message level, while prior studies have only considered 
firm-level analyses (Aerts & Cormier, 2009; Bansal & Clelland, 2004; Cho et al., 2012a; Cho 
& Patten, 2007; Deegan, 2014; Deegan et al., 2002). Secondly, instead of using indirect 
measures of corporate legitimacy, such as reputation rankings or media exposure, we rely on 
stakeholder reactions to corporate disclosures on Facebook. Legitimacy is a concept grounded 
in stakeholder perceptions (Suchman, 1995), typically very hard to measure accurately in an 
archival-type study. Since social media allow stakeholders to directly express their opinions 
and emotional reactions towards corporate disclosures, stakeholder reactions in social media 
become a novel proxy for legitimacy, revealing rich and direct details of how stakeholders 
perceive firms’ CSR disclosures. In addition, this study also makes a methodological 
contribution as it develops a CSR dictionary for computerised textual analysis that identifies 
CSR-related information. Prior studies often manually code CSR disclosures into different 
themes or categories (Deegan et al., 2002; Michelon et al., 2015). However, scholars may face 
challenges in manually classifying CSR-related information from a large volume of 
unstructured data in social media. By using computerised dictionary-based textual analysis, 
researchers may significantly extend the sample size and identify relevant information with 
both increased efficiency and effectiveness. Moreover, the use of a pre-determined dictionary 
increases the transparency and reliability of the coding process. As a result, our study provides 
an empirical validation of a CSR dictionary and illustrates its use in a computer programme 
performing content analysis. Lastly, we also contribute to the stakeholder engagement 
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literature by revealing the dynamic interactions among firm disclosures, stakeholder reactions, 
and firms’ subsequent replies. Prior literature either focuses on the contents of disclosures in 
social media (Colleoni, 2013; Gómez-Carrasco et al., 2017; Saxton et al., 2017), or the 
engagement activities in comments per se (Bellucci & Manetti, 2017; Manetti & Bellucci, 
2016). We are able to provide an overview of, and critical insights about, this dynamic 
engagement. The generally positive reactions obtained from corporate posts suggest little 
opposition from stakeholders. On the other side, the lack of firms’ replies to negative comments 
points toward a selective engagement strategy. Hence, it appears that the use of hypocrisy 
disclosure strategies in social media allows firms to manage stakeholder perceptions and 
maintain legitimacy. However, our findings also question whether social media can lead to any 
public interest outcome per se and call for more research to understand under which conditions 
social media contribute to stakeholders’ mobilization.   
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the 
theoretical framework, and the research hypotheses are developed in Section 3. Sections 4 
presents the research method. Section 5 reports the main evidence and Section 6 some 
additional analysis. We discuss our findings and draw conclusions in Section 7. 
 
2. Theoretical framework  
Recently, Cho et al. (2015) suggest using organizational façade theory (Abrahamson & 
Baumard, 2008) and organized hypocrisy strategies (Brunsson, 1989, 2007) to explain how 
CSR reporting helps to build and maintain corporate legitimacy. In light of divergent and 
sometimes conflicting stakeholder interests, this theoretical approach allows us to investigate 
how firms use hypocrisy talk, decisions, and actions to erect organizational façades and deal 
with different stakeholder expectations.  
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Organizational façades are defined as “symbolic fronts erected by organizational 
participants designed to reassure their organization’s stakeholders of the legitimacy of the 
organizations and its management” (Abrahamson & Baumard, 2008, p. 437). A rational façade 
shows that organizations’ decision-making is the result of rationality and is used to convince 
stakeholders that a certain solution produces the optimal outcome under the current state 
(Abrahamson, 2002). A progressive façade exhibits an organization’s progress towards its 
committed goals and objectives and, in the context of CSR, the progressive façade can play 
both a symbolic and substantive role (Abrahamson & Baumard, 2008; Cho et al., 2015). A 
reputational façade displays various mechanisms to build a positive corporate image in the eyes 
of the most critical stakeholders and often uses language that reflects corporate visions and 
values (Abrahamson & Baumard, 2008). 
Talk, decisions, and actions are used by managers to build these façades and hence, 
they act as tools of legitimacy (Cho et al., 2015). In the traditional decision model, firms assume 
a causal relationship among talk, decisions, and actions (Brunsson, 1993), where talk can 
directly or indirectly lead to corresponding actions. In other words, managers directly use talk 
to demonstrate corporate values, ethics, goals, and objectives so that members of the 
organizations can act consistently with this talk. Alternatively, managers make decisions in 
accordance with previous talk, which, in turn, increase the likelihood of corresponding actions 
(Brunsson, 2007). While the assumptions of the traditional model may work well when an 
organization faces only a small number of stakeholder groups, modern organizations often deal 
with multiple stakeholder groups who have divergent, sometimes conflicting, values and 
interests (Godfrey, 2005). When stakeholders’ interests diverge, the assumption of a causal 
relationship among talk, decisions and actions of the traditional decision model may lead 
managers to a situation where firm’s legitimacy is maintained in the eyes of one stakeholder 
group but not of the others. Neu et al. (1998) document that in presence of divergent interests 
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between financial stakeholders and environmentalists, firms downplay environmentalists’ 
claims by disclosing even less environmental information to avoid any talk and decisions that 
may call for subsequent actions. Consequently, firms are able to maintain legitimacy in the 
eyes of one stakeholder group (financial stakeholders) but not of the others (environmentalists). 
Brunsson (1993, 2007) instead argues that the organized hypocrisy model can help 
maintain legitimacy from stakeholders with divergent interests because the unidirectional 
relation among talk, decisions, and actions allows assigning a “related value” to talk and 
decisions. In other words, rather than disclosing less information, firms use talk and decisions 
to mitigate the potential negative consequences of inconsistent actions. The stronger the belief 
in talk and decisions controlling actions, the greater the relevance of these strategies. The 
“related value” of talk and decisions can give managers an opportunity to manage divergent 
stakeholder perceptions without undergoing any costly actions. Through the use of talk and 
decisions to compensate for the inconsistent actions or vice versa, the relationship among the 
three becomes counter-coupling instead of decoupling (Lipson, 2007). Hypocrisy can, 
therefore, help maintain the legitimacy of firms and manage the perceptions of some 
stakeholder groups through talk and decisions disclosures. Figure 1 illustrates the theoretical 
framework.  
[*** Insert Figure 1 Here ***] 
3. Hypotheses Development 
Research to date focuses only on whether and how firms employ organized hypocrisy 
to erect organizational façades. For instance, Cho et al. (2015) use discourse analysis to study 
oil and gas firms’ annual and sustainability reports, and they find that firms use talk, decisions, 
and actions to present different façades to manage conflicting stakeholder demands. In their 
subsequent study, employing an innovative database of US political contributions, Cho, Laine, 
Roberts, and Rodrigue (2016) document that oil and gas firms act inconsistently with the talk, 
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hence providing additional evidence suggesting the organizational use of hypocrisy strategies. 
Because both studies adopt an organizational perspective and assume that the strategies can 
affect stakeholder perceptions, how stakeholders perceive hypocrisy strategies remains an 
unexplored question.  
 Similar to the argument made by Neu et al. (1998), and discussed above, in the 
traditional decision model, firms’ actions are assumed to be consistent with prior talk and 
decisions. So, if firms act contrary to the expectations of some stakeholder groups, they only 
disclose about those actions that are consistent with prior talk and decisions. However, 
according to Brunsson (2007), the withholding of information can cause questioning from 
some stakeholders, triggering the use of talk and decisions to compensate for the inconsistent 
actions or vice versa (hypocrisy model).  
Traditionally, CSR literature assumes that stakeholders generally perceive disclosures 
of corporate actions as credible, under the basic assumption of a causal relation among talk, 
decisions and actions. Prior literature on the quality of CSR reporting documents that firms are 
more likely to report information on general expectations for the future than results and 
outcomes of plans (Michelon et al., 2015), highlighting the scarce use of actions disclosure by 
firms. Such lack of focus on actual actions and outcomes mirrors a lack of comprehensiveness 
(Bouten, Everaert, Van Liedekerke, De Moor, & Christiaens, 2011), which conveys little 
substantive information for assessment. Because actions reflect activities that firms are doing 
and/or have undertaken, this information is verifiable and hence more credible (Mercer, 2004). 
Given how much boilerplate information is disclosed in CSR reports (Michelon et al., 2015), 
stakeholders may react positively when they spot actions-related information. Some empirical 
studies also support such a view. For example, Aerts and Cormier (2009) find that media 
legitimacy is only driven by quantitative disclosures. Similarly, Brown, Guidry, and Patten 
(2009) find that the relationship between sustainability report quality and corporate perceived 
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reputation (measured using Fortune Most Admired Scores) is significant only for good 
performers, who are more likely to disclose hard, actions-related information. When actions 
are insufficient to meet or contrary to the expectations of stakeholders, managers simply choose 
not to disclose them (Neu et al., 1998). Consequently, actions disclosures are more likely to 
attract positive stakeholder reactions, which lead to our first hypothesis: 
H1a. CSR actions disclosures are positively associated with positive stakeholder 
reactions.  
 
However, in Brusson’s (2007) hypocrisy model, firms can disclose actions to different 
stakeholder groups even though these actions may still be in-progress or not meet the 
expectations of some stakeholders. In this situation, because of the divergent and conflicting 
stakeholder demands faced, the provision of actions disclosures to one group of stakeholders 
may attract negative reactions from another group. Along these lines, Groening and Kanuri 
(2013) document that, in presence of a positive social action for a group of stakeholders, 
investors do not reward the firm. Given the presence of different stakeholder groups in social 
media (Gómez-Carrasco & Michelon, 2017), the disclosure of actions information may also 
attract negative reactions. Hence,  
H1b. CSR actions disclosures are positively associated with negative stakeholder 
reactions. 
 
Prior CSR disclosure literature suggests that talk and decisions disclosures are also 
associated with positive stakeholder perceptions. For example, Bansal and Clelland (2004) find 
that firms with low environmental legitimacy can reduce their unsystematic risks by expressing 
environmental commitments, suggesting financial stakeholders attach value to talk and 
decisions. Similarly, in an experimental setting, Milne and Patten (2002) document that, in 
presence of mandatory negative environmental disclosures, the provision of additional, 
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voluntary positive environmental disclosures, such as firms’ commitments and forward-
looking disclosures, affect positively investment allocation by investors with long-term 
strategies and those concerned with environmental issues. Using an archival approach, Cho et 
al. (2012a) find a positive association between environmental disclosures and both 
environmental reputation scores and the membership in the Dow Jones Sustainability Index, 
even in the presence of poor environmental performance, suggesting that reputation appears to 
be driven more by what firms say than what they do. Overall, this evidence suggests 
stakeholders perceive what firms say as indicative of what they do.  
 While Brunsson (2007) argues that talk and decisions normally reach wider stakeholder 
groups than actions, whether and how stakeholders react to these disclosures is not theoretically 
clear. He notes that stakeholders can be “idealists” or “materialists” (Brunsson, 2007, p. 117). 
If stakeholders are “idealists”, they perceive the image that firms construct as a highly 
admirable standing. They believe that talk and decisions are important on their own, and their 
demands can be partially fulfilled by corporate talk and decisions. As a result, talk and 
decisions may shape stakeholders’ positive attitudes and/or mitigate their negative concerns. 
However, if stakeholders are “materialists”, they would be aware of possible discrepancies 
among talk, decisions and actions. In this case, if organizations make talk and decisions 
disclosures rather than actions disclosure, “materialist” stakeholders know that the likelihood 
of corresponding actions is significantly low since talk and decisions are just empty words 
(Brunsson, 2007). As a result, these stakeholders would ignore talk and decisions.  
Brunsson’s (2007) model assumes that there are always some stakeholders who 
question firms’ actions. Therefore, when stakeholders’ perceptions suggest that legitimacy is 
at risk (i.e. negative reactions), firms supply talk and decisions disclosures to mitigate 
stakeholders’ concerns. If the predictions of the hypocrisy model hold, while CSR actions 
disclosures are likely to be associated with both positive and negative reactions, CSR talk and 
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decisions disclosures tend to generate only positive reactions, or even decrease the likelihood 
of negative reactions. As a result, the legitimacy from stakeholders with divergent interests can 
be simultaneously maintained. Following this stream of argument, we develop two sets of 
hypotheses for CSR talk and decisions disclosures: 
H2a. CSR talk and decisions disclosures are positively associated with positive 
stakeholder reactions. 
H2b. CSR talk and decisions disclosures are not (positively) associated with negative 
stakeholder reactions. 
  
Finally, the intensity of stakeholder reactions may be different for talk and decisions 
versus actions disclosures. Talk and decisions disclosures are related to corporate visions and 
intentions, which are normally qualitative and soft, while actions disclosures relate to results 
and outcomes, which are usually quantitative and hard (Michelon et al., 2015). On one side, all 
talk, decisions, and actions disclosures can affect stakeholder perceptions to a certain degree. 
For example, Cho and Patten (2007) analyze the level of monetary and soft disclosures made 
by firms in environmentally sensitive industries (ESI) in comparison to firms in non-ESI. They 
find that, in non-ESI, worse environmental performers disclose soft environmental disclosures 
to a greater extent than their better-performing counterparts. However, in ESI, the level of soft 
disclosure is similar both for poor and good performers. These findings suggest that 
stakeholders in non-ESI may be less demanding, hence talk and decisions can be sufficient to 
meet their expectations. However, stakeholders in ESI need more concrete corporate actions 
(i.e. monetary disclosures), beyond talk and decisions disclosures. On the other side, if 
stakeholders attach importance to all talk, decisions, and actions, and indeed actions disclosures 
are perceived as more credible because they use quantitative and verifiable information, then 
the disclosures of talk and decisions may affect stakeholder perceptions to a lesser extent than 
disclosures on actions. Prior empirical studies provide evidence supporting this expectation. 
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For example, Toms (2002) documents that general rhetoric can significantly increase corporate 
reputation when firms change from no disclosure at all to the disclosure of corporate 
commitments. However, extra talk and decisions disclosure has no effect on reputation until 
firms start disclosing quantifiable statements regarding the implementation and monitoring of 
policies and targets. Therefore, stakeholders perceive actions more positively than talk and 
decisions, but talk and decisions are also effective in managing stakeholder perceptions per se. 
Thus, we propose a third hypothesis as follows: 
H3. The intensity of stakeholder reactions is greater for CSR actions disclosures than 
CSR talk and decisions disclosures. 
 
4. Research methods 
4.1. Data collection and sample 
In order to examine directly stakeholders’ reactions to CSR disclosure strategies, our 
empirical research exploits big data about the interactions between S&P100 firms and their 
stakeholders on Facebook. Not only is Facebook one of the most popular social media sites 
used by firms to communicate CSR activities (Bellucci & Manetti, 2017) and analyze 
stakeholder behavior patterns (Gandomi & Haider, 2015), but it can also be seen as a public 
arena of citizenship with divergent stakeholder interests (Whelan et al., 2013). Therefore, there 
is an opportunity for firms to employ legitimation strategies in the messages they post. 
Furthermore, unlike microblog sites like Twitter, Facebook posts do not have character limits 
and Facebook’s layout presents users a more intuitive outlook of stakeholder reactions and 
comments than does Twitter. Finally, followers voluntarily subscribe to a corporate Facebook 
page to receive updates and the uses of the novel emoticons may reveal more details on their 
perceptions towards the organizations (Guo & Saxton, 2018; Xu & Saxton, 2018). Our 
assumption is that subscribers following a company on Facebook self-select as stakeholders of 
that company. We choose firms in the S&P100 index as, being highly visible, they face more 
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divergent stakeholder demands than smaller firms and they have devoted significant 
investments in social media (Investis, 2015). Our sample period runs from 24th February 2016 
to 2nd March 2017. The choice of the start date for our analysis is related to the introduction of 
the new emoticons feature on Facebook.  
Our unit of analysis is the message post, and we consider all disclosures posted by firms 
on Facebook during the time analyzed. To retrieve corporate posts, we first look for a link to 
the Facebook page on corporate websites. If the link is not present on the website, we then 
search Facebook to identify the corporate pages. Of the S&P 100 firms, we find that 16 have 
either no Facebook account or no content posted on their Facebook page. We exclude these 
firms from our analysis.  We also exclude three additional firms due to other data unavailability, 
leaving us with a final sample of 81 firms. The list of firms included in our study is provided 
in Appendix A. 
We use a Python script, a programming language, to access the Facebook application 
programming interface (API) and download all historical post data from the firms in our sample. 
The retrieved data include text of the published messages, publication date, total number of 
shares, total number of emoticons (six emotions: ‘like’, ‘love’, ‘haha’, ‘wow’, ‘sad’, and 
‘angry’), total number of comments, as well as text of comments under each post.1 Overall, we 
include a total of 21,166 posts.  
To identify CSR organized hypocrisy disclosures,2 we write an ad hoc R script to 
perform a textual analysis of Facebook posts (Loughran & McDonald, 2016). Following a “bag 
of words” approach (Loughran & McDonald, 2011), we develop a dictionary (Appendix B) 
from GRI reporting guidelines and KLD (2013) rating criteria to categorize posts into CSR (n 
                                                 
1 The total number of comments retrieved is 1,525,955.  
2 Given the plethora of definitions for CSR (Huang & Watson, 2015), we adopt a pragmatic approach and classify 
disclosure using the seven CSR dimensions suggested by the KLD ratings: community, corporate governance, 
diversity, employee relations, environment, human rights, and product.  
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= 7,104) and non-CSR posts (n = 14,062). Posts are then manually checked to eliminate any 
misclassification. Next, we proceed with a manual coding of CSR-related posts,3 classifying 
them into three hypocrisy strategies: talk, decisions, and actions, using the coding guideline 
provided in Appendix C.4,5  
4.2 Empirical Models and Variables Measurement 
In order to test H1a, H1b, H2a and H2b, we consider the full sample of posts (N=21,166), 
including non-CSR disclosures as a baseline to capture stakeholders’ average level of reactions 
when they see non-CSR disclosures. We specify the following model: 
 Stak_Reactions = β0 + 1CSR_Act + 2CSR_Talk + 3CSR_Decision + 
4Size+ 5Character_log + 6URL + 7Hashtag + 8Visuals + 9Firm + 
10Week + ε (1) 
 
To test H3, we compare the effects of actions versus talk and decisions disclosures 
restricting our sample to only CSR-related posts (N=7,104). We set talk and decisions 
disclosures as the baseline because we are interested in comparing the effects of actions 
disclosures on stakeholder reactions. Our model for H3 is specified as: 
 Stak_Reactions = β0 + 1CSR_Act + 2Size + 3Character_log + 4URL + 
5Hashtag + 6Visuals + + 7Firm + 8Week + ε (2) 
We measure Stak_Reactions with several alternative measures of stakeholder general 
reactions (i.e. the number of likes, shares, and comments), and specific reactions (dummy 
                                                 
3 The coding was conducting by one author. To ensure consistent outcomes, the coding was conducted and 
repeated in April, June and August 2017. 
4 We computed the Cronbach Alpha to check the internal consistency for hypocrisy and façade coding over three 
different time periods (April, June, and August 2017). The Cronbach Alpha for hypocrisy strategy coding is 
0.9310 and the Cronbach Alpha for façade strategy coding is 0.9956.  
5 As we look at the relation between stakeholder reactions and organization façades in out additional analysis, the 
coding has also been used to classify the three façades: rational, progressive, and reputational. Appendix C reports 
both coding rules. 
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variables for ‘love’, ‘wow’, ‘haha’, ‘sad’, ‘angry’, positive and negative comments). Hence, 
we alternatively employ a negative binomial and logit model.6  
The first measure of stakeholder general reactions we consider is the total number of 
‘likes’ (Likes) because it represents a general positive stakeholder sentiment ( Saxton & Waters, 
2014) and acts as a rough indicator of stakeholders’ acknowledgement of the post. We also 
consider the total number of ‘shares’ (Shares) to represent public resonance. A ‘Share’ reflects 
how broadly the post spreads among the public, and high levels of re-posting can increase the 
message visibility and improve the perceptions of message quality and favorability (Saxton et 
al., 2017). Finally, our third measure of stakeholder general reactions is the number of 
comments (Comments), which represents the level of engagement between stakeholders and 
the message, thus the larger this number, the greater the engagement with respect to each post.  
We further use measures for specific stakeholder reactions to capture the positive vs. 
negative perceptions of corporate posts, by considering the use of the ‘love’, ‘wow’, ‘haha’, 
‘sad’, and ‘angry’ emoticons, and the presence of negative or positive comments. We create 
dummy variables for each of these five emoticons (Love, Wow, Haha, Sad, Angry),7 assigning 
a value of “1” if each post receives at least once the specific emoticon reaction, and “0” 
otherwise.8 Comments are more genuine representations of stakeholders’ attitudes towards 
firms’ CSR disclosures (Etter, Colleoni, Illia, Meggiorin, & D’Eugenio, 2018). Hence, 
following Saxton and Waters (2014), we also look at the valence of comments (positive or 
                                                 
6 Both the Poisson and the Negative Binomial (NB) models are more appropriate for count variables than Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS) (Saxton & Waters, 2014). However, one of the assumptions for Poisson regression models is 
that the conditional variance should be equal to the conditional mean (Wooldridge, 2010). Since the number of 
reactions, shares, and comments in social media have much higher variance than the mean (i.e. over-dispersion), 
we adopt the NB regression (Saxton & Waters, 2014).   
7 Since Facebook does not provide a separate button for newly introduced emoticons (users need to long-press the 
‘like’ button on smartphones or hover over the ‘like’ button on the website to reveal these additional emoticons), 
there is a real difference between posts that receive at least one type of emoticon and those that do not. 
Accordingly, we employ dummy rather than count variables, following Saxton et al. (2017). 
8 For robustness, we also consider the number of each emoticon per post and run OLS models. All results 
(untabulated) are consistent with our main analysis. 
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negative). We use two dummy variables (PosComment and NegComment). Both variables are 
equal to “1” if a post receives at least one positive comment or one negative comment, and “0” 
otherwise. To compute these two variables, we perform a computerized VADER sentiment 
analysis to calculate the net sentiment score of each individual comment (Gilbert & Hutto, 
2014) and identify whether there is at least one positive or one negative comment for each 
post.9  
Our actions hypocrisy variable (CSR_Act) is coded “1” if the post discloses actions 
information, and “0” otherwise. The talk disclosure variable (CSR_Talk) is set to “1” if the post 
discloses talk information, and “0” otherwise. Similarly, the decisions disclosure variable 
(CSR_Decision) is set to “1” if the post discloses decision information, and “0” otherwise.  
Following Saxton et al. (2017), we also include several controls at the post level. We 
use the logarithmic transformation of the number of characters (Character_log) within each 
post to control the amount of information communicated with stakeholders, as prior social-
psychology literature suggests that longer text is more persuasive and convincing than shorter 
text as “length implies strength” (Chaiken & Eagly, 1989).10 Next, we create a dummy for the 
inclusion of hyperlinks (URL) in each post. Hyperlinks can take users to an external web page 
where additional information regarding corporate activities is available, hence stakeholders can 
make more informed decisions on whether and how to react to the post. Hashtags initiate public 
discussions on a topic and increase public response (Saxton et al., 2017), therefore we create a 
dummy (Hashtag) to control the use of hashtags. Next, we create a dummy for the presence of 
photos and videos (Visuals) since visual contents can present stakeholders a more institutive 
outlook of corporate information (Saxton & Waters, 2014) and it also generates stronger 
framing effects on stakeholders’ attitudes than texts (Powell, Boomgaarden, De Swert, & de 
                                                 
9 Net sentiment score is sum of scores of positive words and negative words. 
10 Number of characters in each post is calculated without including space between words. 
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Vreese, 2015). We also control for firm size because large firms are likely to attract more 
divergent demands and reactions (Saxton et al., 2017). We use the natural log transformation 
of firm quarterly total assets as a proxy for firm size (Size). All models include firm fixed 
effects to account for time-invariant unobservable firm-level factors and week fixed effects to 
eliminate time-trend effects.11 
Table 1 summarizes the construction of all variables. 
[***Insert Table 1 about here***] 
5. Findings 
5.1. Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics. The average number (standard deviation) of likes, 
shares, and comments for each post is approximately 1,184 (10,610), 181 (1,604) and 54 (423), 
respectively. This wide-spanning distribution suggests not only a real difference between posts 
that are liked, shared or commented on versus those that are not, but also a significant 
difference between posts that receive few general reactions and posts that receive a great 
amount of attentions. 
In terms of specific reactions, except for ‘love’, the percentage of posts receiving an 
emotion reaction is low, with ‘sad’ being the lowest (12%), followed by ‘haha’ (24%), ‘angry’ 
(25%) and ‘wow’ (40%). The distribution of data also reveals that over half of the posts do not 
receive any of the ‘wow’, ‘haha’, ‘sad’, or ‘angry’ emoticons. With regards to the sentiment of 
comments, about 64% of posts generate at least one positive comment and 43% of posts receive 
at least one negative comment. Although positive comments are more common than negative 
                                                 
11 Standard errors in all models are robust. In additional, non-tabulated, analysis we have performed the regression 
analyses using day fixed effects, instead of week fixed effects. Our evidence is robust to the choice of the time 
effects.  
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ones, almost half of the posts receive at least one negative comment, suggesting stakeholders 
have diverse views on corporate disclosures.  
In terms of the CSR hypocrisy strategies used, 8% of total posts use CSR actions 
disclosure, about 22% of posts employs CSR talk disclosure, and 3% of posts use CSR 
decisions disclosure, suggesting that firms use more talk than actions disclosure to 
communicate with stakeholders on CSR issues.12 
 With respect to control variables, the average logarithm of the number of characters is 
4.84 with a standard deviation of 1.09 (i.e. each post contains on average 126 characters). 
Although Facebook has no restriction on the length of a message, the average character count 
is close to the Twitter threshold of 140 characters suggesting firms may be sharing similar posts 
on both platforms. With regards to the multimedia characteristics of posts, 47% of firms’ 
messages contain a hyperlink which can take users to an external web page. In contrast to 
Twitter, which has a heavy use of hashtags and less use of photos (Saxton et al., 2017), our 
Facebook results indicate 70% of posts attach photos or videos and only 36% of posts include 
a hashtag to initiate discussions.   
[***Insert Table 2 about here***] 
Table 3 presents the Pearson correlations for the various stakeholder reactions and 
independent variables. The results show that most of the hypocrisy strategies are significantly 
correlated with various stakeholder reactions. The highest VIF is 1.18 (un-tabulated), 
suggesting multicollinearity is not a concern.  
[***Insert Table 3 about here***] 
5.2. Multivariate Analysis 
 Table 4 Panel A reports the results of our regression estimations using the general 
stakeholder reactions. Analysis using the number of likes generated by stakeholders (Column 
                                                 
12 Appendix D illustrates some examples of the hypocrisy strategies (and façades). 
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1) indicates that actions disclosure (CSR_Act) is the only hypocrisy variable significantly 
related to the amount of ‘likes’. This suggests stakeholders may only give acknowledgement 
or general approval to actions disclosures. To interpret the impact of this hypocrisy strategy on 
the number of likes, we convert the coefficient into an incidence rate ratio (IRR), interpreted 
as the factor change in the dependent variable for one unit change in the explanatory variable 
(Saxton & Waters, 2014).13 CSR_Act has an IRR of 2.39, indicating the number of likes to a 
CSR actions disclosure is 2.39 times higher than the number of likes to a non-CSR post. 
Column 2 presents results where the number of shares is the dependent variable. The results 
show that CSR_Act is positively and significantly related to the number of shares, whereas 
CSR_Talk is negatively related (and significant at p < .05). We do not find any significant 
association on CSR_Decision. Finally, Column 3 reports the relations of interest when 
stakeholder reactions are measured as the number of comments generated by each post. 
Consistent with results of previous two general reactions, actions disclosures (CSR_Act) are 
again positively and significantly related to the dependent variable. However, in this regression, 
both CSR_Talk and CSR_Decision are negative and significant (at p < .01 for the former, and 
< .05 for the latter). One possible explanation for the negative relations is that stakeholders see 
talk or decisions as symbolic and conveying little information for decision-making and hence 
are less willing to comment on talk or decisions disclosures. This would be consistent with 
stakeholders being “materialists”. Alternatively, and as we further argue in the concluding 
section, if firms’ CSR talk or decisions are consistent with social norms and people live in a 
“culture of hope” (Brunsson, 2006, p. 185), they would hope these values and goals are 
desirable and worthy of pursuit. Consequently, stakeholders may be less likely to question a 
goal that everyone is hoping to achieve, and less likely to comment on such posts.  
                                                 
13 IRR results were obtained by running command: nbreg, irr after running each negative binomial regression 
model in STATA. 
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[***Insert Table 4 about here***] 
 Table 4 Panel B presents the logit regression results for testing our two first sets of 
hypotheses when we consider specific stakeholder reactions. Columns 1 to 3 report the 
relations between disclosure strategies and positive reactions (respectively, Love, Wow and 
Haha). As indicated in the columns, all three disclosure types (i.e., CSR_Act, CSR_Talk and 
CSR_Decision) are significantly and positively related to the Love reaction.  However, for the 
Wow and Haha reactions, CSR_Act is positive and CSR_Talk is negative, and both are 
statistically significant.  In contrast, CSR_Decision is not. These results suggest stakeholders 
are less impressed by talk disclosures, possibly because corporate talk is consistent with 
stakeholder expectations, hence less surprising. Columns 4 and 5 show that the disclosure 
strategies are diversely associated with the negative emotion reactions, Sad and Angry, 
respectively. CSR_Act (CSR_Talk) is more (less) likely to generate a Sad reaction, indicating 
that stakeholders get more (less) disappointed by actions (talk) disclosures. The consistent and 
positive effect of CSR_Decision and CSR_Act on Angry may suggest that stakeholders interpret 
decisions as increasing the likelihood of corresponding actions. Finally, the likelihood of 
receiving a positive comment (Column 6), is positively associated only with CSR_Act, while 
the likelihood of receiving a negative comment (Column 7) is positively associated with 
CSR_Act and negatively associated with CSR_Talk. However, we note that CSR_Act is more 
highly related to the likelihood of a positive, as opposed to a negative comment. This suggests 
that, although stakeholders have divergent opinions on firms’ CSR actions disclosures, on 
average they tend not to criticize them. Overall, there seem to be opposite stakeholder emotions 
expressed towards CSR actions disclosures and that CSR talk disclosures are less likely to 
receive such conflicting reactions. Combined with the results for the general reactions, our 
results indicate associations between stakeholder reactions and talk, decisions, and actions 
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disclosures. However, actions disclosures, in particular, appear to lead to mixed emotions. 
Hence, taken together, our evidence is aligned with the first two sets of hypotheses. 
In order to test H3 (whether there is a greater stakeholder reaction on CSR actions than 
on CSR talk and decisions disclosures), we use equation (2) and focus only on the CSR posts. 
Table 5 presents the results of these tests. Consistent with our expectations, Panel A shows that 
the number of likes (Column 1), the number of shares (Column 2), and the number comments 
(Column 3), are greater when a firm posts an actions disclosure (CSR_Act) than when it 
discloses CSR talk or decisions (baseline). These results align with H3 and suggest that 
stakeholders do react more strongly to CSR actions disclosures than to CSR talk or decisions 
disclosures, generally showing approval about what firms do. However, because corporate 
CSR actions may meet some stakeholders’ demands while compromising others, actions 
disclosures tend to attract more conflicting reactions among stakeholders – as evidenced in 
Panel B where CSR_Act is positively associated with all emotions. The odds of receiving Love 
and Haha are similar, and the odds of receiving Wow is generally higher, suggesting that 
stakeholders are more impressed when reading what firms have done rather than what they are 
saying or deciding on CSR issues. In terms of negative emotions, CSR_Act is also likely to 
attract Sad or Angry, suggesting actions disclosure may not be able to meet divergent 
stakeholder demands completely as some stakeholders expressing disappointment or 
dissatisfaction. With regards to the valence of comments, although CSR_Act is likely to 
generate more positive (PosComment) and negative (NegComment) comments than CSR_Talk 
and CSR_Decision, the likelihood of receiving at least one negative comment is higher than 
receiving at least one positive comment. This finding suggests stakeholders are more likely to 
write negative comments under actions disclosures than under talk or decisions disclosures. 
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This result further confirms that talk and decisions disclosures are less likely to attract negative 
comments, suggesting they may help to mitigate stakeholder’s concerns.14  
[***Insert Table 5 about here***] 
6. Additional analysis 
6.1 Organizational façades and stakeholder reactions 
 
Companies combine talk, decisions, and actions to build façades (Cho et al., 2015). In 
turn, CSR façades help maintain legitimacy (Abrahamson & Baumard, 2008). Hence, we 
explore how stakeholders react to organizational façades, by grouping talk, decisions, and 
actions disclosures used to construct each façade.  
The rational façade is essential to gain market legitimacy, and it is a basic 
organizational behavior expected by stakeholders (Cho et al., 2015). The reputational façade is 
erected by displaying symbols, mission statements, and values to shape a positive corporate 
image (Abrahamson & Baumard, 2008; Cho et al., 2015). Since it demonstrates a firm’s long-
term commitment to stakeholder demands (Brunsson, 2007), stakeholders may perceive it more 
positively than the rational façade. Firms erect the progressive façade to demonstrate they are 
progressing from their current position towards their long-term goals and objectives, and they 
do this in three ways: 1) camouflaging the status-quo, 2) showing progress symbolically, and 
3) facilitating substantive progression towards long-term commitments (Abrahamson & 
Baumard, 2008). These three roles intertwine together to create an ex-post congruence between 
current practices and desired positions (Abrahamson & Baumard, 2008). Due to its potential 
                                                 
14 For robustness, we re-run all models including day fixed effects to eliminate trend effects and the evidence is 
consistent with our main analysis. Further, we replaced firm fixed effects with industry fixed effects using two 
approaches: 1) separating samples into environmental and social sensitive industries (ESSI) and non-
environmental and social sensitive industries (non-ESSI) and then re-running regressions within each sub-sample; 
and 2) replacing firm fixed effects with industry fixed effects using firms’ 4-digit SIC code. For the first approach, 
following Cho and Patten (2007) and Michelon, Patten, and Romi (2018), we classify firms from the chemical, 
mining, metals, papers, petroleum, and utility industries as environmentally sensitive and firm from 
pharmaceutical, alcoholic beverage, and defense industries as social sensitive (Brammer & Millington, 2005). 
The results are largely consistent with the main results, although we note that stakeholders of ESSI firms are more 
demanding than those of non-ESSI firms, consistent with the findings of Cho and Patten (2007). 
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for organizational change, stakeholders may perceive the progressive façade as more 
acceptable than the reputational façade, which is symbolic without any subsequent progress 
(Christensen, Morsing, & Thyssen, 2013). The progressive façade may also play a role in 
bridging across the rational and reputational façades, hence easing stakeholder dissatisfactions 
and obtaining their approval (Cho et al., 2015). Nevertheless, the possible symbolic use of the 
progressive façade may lead to negative reactions. Since some stakeholders have completely 
different interests and some may lack the information regarding what is truly happening behind 
the façade, it might result in more negative reactions and greater skepticism than the other two 
façades.  
In order to understand stakeholder perceptions of organizational façades built around 
CSR, we run an analysis similar to the one reported in Table 5. However, we use disclosure 
variables measuring organizational façades instead of hypocrisy strategies. We set the rational 
façade as the baseline and we identify progressive façade disclosures as a dummy variable 
(Progressive) equal to “1” if the post contributes to erect a progressive façade, “0” otherwise. 
We also build a reputational façade variable (Reputational), coded “1” if the post contributes 
to erecting a reputational façade, “0” otherwise.  
Table 6 reports the results across all measures of stakeholder reactions. Progressive is 
associated with a greater number of likes (Column 1). The coefficient of Reputational is not 
significant, but the within regression significant F-test indicates a pecking order in which 
Progressive receives more likes than Reputational and the rationale façade (baseline). With 
respect to the number of shares and comments (Columns 2 and 3, respectively), Progressive is 
not significantly different from the baseline but it receives more reactions than Reputational 
(as indicated by the significant F-test). For the specific stakeholder reactions (Columns 4 to 
10), we document that stakeholders are more likely to react with positive emotions towards the 
progressive and the reputational façade (see results for Love and Wow). With regards to Sad, 
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Progressive is more likely to receive disappointment compared to Reputational. Given that 
reputational façade is used to construct a positive corporate image, it is less likely to cause 
stakeholders’ negative emotions. The mitigation effect of reputational façade on negative 
emotions is also observed in Angry, where Reputational is less likely to receive ‘angry’ 
reactions compared to both Progressive and Rational. A similar pattern is reported for the 
presence of negative comments (Column 10). Combing this mitigation effect with the positive 
effect on Love, our evidence suggests that Reputational plays a role in reducing stakeholder 
negative reactions. In contrast, Progressive is likely to get more likes and ‘wow’ compared to 
the other two façades, but it is also more likely to attract negative reactions from stakeholders 
than Reputational, suggesting progressive façade may contain elements of both reputational 
and rational façades.  
[***Insert Table 6 about here***] 
6.2. Firm replies to stakeholder reactions 
 
 So far, we have explored how stakeholders perceive the hypocrisy (and façade) 
strategies used in Facebook posts and found that actions disclosures and progressive façade 
seem to attract more negative reactions than other strategies. Since stakeholders can write 
comments and express their sentiments under a post, it becomes interesting to look at the 
dynamism occurring between these comments and firms’ replies. In other words, how do 
stakeholder reactions trigger firms’ post-disclosure replies? Our logit model for analyzing the 
likelihood that a firm replies to stakeholder comments is specified as follows:15 
 Reply = β0 + 1 Emotion_Sentiment + 2 Comment_Sentiment + 3 
Emotions_log + 4 Comments_log + 5 Firm + 6 Week + ε (3) 
                                                 
15 We focus on CSR posts only because we want to limit stakeholder concerns to CSR-related issues 
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Where Reply is a dummy variable equals to 1 when a firm replies to at least one 
comment under a post. We run this model across two groups of Facebook posts, identified by 
the disclosure strategies used in the post, i.e. (1) actions disclosures, (2) talk or decisions 
disclosures. Emotion_Sentiment measures the sentiment level of stakeholder specific reactions 
and is computed using the Janis-Fadner coefficient of imbalance (Aerts & Cormier, 2009; 
Bansal & Clelland, 2004; Janis & Fadner, 1943).16 The variable ranges from -1 to +1 with a 
higher coefficient suggesting the presence of more positive specific reactions (sum of the 
number of loves, hahas, and wows) than negative ones (sum of the number of sads and 
angrys).17 Comment_Sentiment measures the sentiment of stakeholder comments for each post. 
It is also calculated using Janis-Fadner coefficient between the number of positive and negative 
comments. We use the log transformation of the number of reactions (Emotions_log) to capture 
the intensity of stakeholder reactions (the sum of likes, loves, hahas, wows, sads, and angrys). 
We also use the log transformation of the number of comments (Comments_log) for the 
intensity of comments. We include firm fixed effects to control for individual firm 
characteristics and week fixed effects to capture trends that may affect stakeholder sentiments 
and firm replies in time.  
Table 7 reports the results of our firm reply tests. Column 1 reports positive and 
significant coefficients for the sentiment (Comment_Sentiment) and the intensity of comments 
(Comments_log) to an actions disclosure, suggesting that when stakeholders make more, and 
more positive, comments to an actions disclosure, firms are more likely to engage in a reply. 
This evidence suggests that firms tend to ignore negative comments, and employ a selective 
stakeholder engagement approach, providing a reply to positive, rather than negative, reactions. 
                                                 
16 The Janis-Fadner coefficient equals to zero when the number of positive emoticons equals to the number of 
negative emoticons or when both number of positive and negative emoticons are zero under a post (Janis & 
Fadner, 1943). 
17 We exclude the number of likes because stakeholders may simply click a ‘Like’ to show their acknowledgement 
of the content, potentially introducing noise into the measure. 
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This appears to be inconsistent with prior CSR disclosure relying on legitimacy theory, as firms 
would be expected to respond more in the presence of negative comments. However, the 
positive effect of the intensity of comments on the likelihood to reply points towards a 
legitimacy story. Instead of replying in the presence of few comments when social media 
response teams are less overwhelmed and have more time to communicate with stakeholders, 
we see more replies when posts are highly visible. Thus, the reply policy seems to be used to 
reinforce the hypocrisy disclosure strategy employed in the post (i.e. CSR actions), with firms 
responding to positive comments. It may also be driven by reputational risk management 
purposes, as more comments increase the risk of exposing firms’ organized hypocrisy 
(Bebbington, Larrinaga, & Moneva, 2008). Column 2 shows positive and significant 
coefficients for the sentiment expressed by emoticons (Emotion_Sentiment), the sentiment of 
comments (Comment_Sentiment) and the intensity of comments (Comments_log) to talk or 
decisions disclosures. This evidence again suggests that firms are likely to reply in the presence 
of more positive reactions. However, the intensity of stakeholder emotions (Emotions_log) is 
negatively associated with firm’s reply in talk-decisions posts. As, generally, the number of 
positive emotions is greater than the number of negative emotions, the negative coefficient 
suggests that once stakeholders have demonstrated sufficient amount of positive emotions, 
there is no need for the firm to reply.  
Overall, our additional analyses suggest firms are selectively engaging with 
stakeholders. The positive effects of the sentiment of comments on the likelihood to reply 
indicate that firms are likely to reply to stakeholders who are positive about the firms while 
neglecting those who are criticizing or showing concerns on a firm’s CSR practices. The 
significance of the intensity of emotions and comments variables suggests firms are monitoring 
stakeholder perceptions on Facebook for reputational risk and legitimacy purposes but not 
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using it as a platform for true stakeholder engagement, which is consistent with results in 
Gómez-Carrasco et al. (2017) and Manetti and Bellucci (2016). 
7. Discussion, implications for future research, and conclusions 
Using organized hypocrisy theory (Brunsson, 1989, 1993, 2007), we investigate how 
stakeholders react to the legitimation strategies employed in firms’ CSR disclosures on 
Facebook. By focusing on the dynamic interactions between firm disclosure strategies and 
stakeholder subsequent reactions in social media and at the post level, our findings demonstrate 
that stakeholders exhibit diverse reactions towards firms’ hypocrisy (and façade) strategies and 
the intensity and valence of their reactions also have effects on firms’ post-disclosure replies 
to stakeholder comments. 
Our first set of hypotheses looks at how stakeholders react to corporate actions 
disclosures. Prior literature suggests that hard or factual information can enhance firms’ 
legitimacy (Aerts & Cormier, 2009; Brown et al., 2009). Although we find that actions 
disclosures are likely to help firms maintain legitimacy from stakeholders (reflected in positive 
emotions and comments), we also document that they are associated with a higher likelihood 
of receiving negative reactions (i.e., ‘Sad’, ‘Angry’, and negative comments). In contrast to 
prior literature suggesting that firms’ legitimacy is related to the disclosure of hard information, 
we observe that actions disclosures are more likely to attract divergent stakeholder perceptions. 
Our empirical analyses, altogether, are also aligned with the second set of hypotheses that 
stakeholders generally react positively to talk and decisions disclosures. Specifically, we find 
firms’ CSR talk and decisions disclosures are more likely to receive ‘Love’. However, while 
CSR talk disclosures are less likely to receive negative reactions (‘Sad’, ‘Angry”, and negative 
comments), we surprisingly find that CSR decisions disclosures have a higher likelihood of 
attracting ‘Angry’ reactions, possibly because stakeholders may interpret decisions as 
increasing the likelihood of corresponding actions.  
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The presence of all talk, decisions, and actions disclosures employed in firms’ 
Facebook CSR posts suggest that firms need all three strategies to maintain legitimacy. Firms 
need to continuously close the gaps across talk, decisions, and actions through frequent updates 
on their progression to ensure the stability of hypocrisy (Brunsson, 2007) and to buy more time 
and flexibility in meeting the divergent demands (Cho et al., 2015; Christensen et al., 2013). 
Because it is impossible for firms to achieve progress in all areas at a time, there are always 
some groups who demand more or have demands on other issues, hence resulting both positive 
and negative reactions to actions disclosures. However, the presence of CSR talk and decisions 
disclosures mitigates the negative reactions. Our results, therefore, seem to indicate that 
stakeholders believe in the causal relationship among talk, decisions, and actions in that both 
CSR talk and decisions disclosures are associated with a higher likelihood of receiving ‘Love’ 
from stakeholders, while the significant negative association of talk disclosures to negative 
reactions can be explained if such talk disclosures are consistent with social expectations 
(Christensen et al., 2013). As a result, if firms’ CSR talk or decisions are consistent with social 
norms, stakeholders are less likely to criticize a wish that everyone in the society is hoping for 
(Brunsson, 2006). At the same time, these expressed CSR commitments are often taken for 
granted by social members. Consequently, corporate talk is less likely to impress stakeholders 
on Facebook resulting in a lower likelihood of receiving ‘Wow’ and ‘Haha’ reactions. However, 
once firms disclose decisions on a CSR issue, stakeholders seem to have divergent views and 
the conflicting expectations start emerging, as we observe decisions disclosures attract opposite 
reactions. However, as Brunsson (2007, pp. 116-117) argues: 
“Without hypocrisy, one party or interest would be completely satisfied and all 
others completely dissatisfied. With hypocrisy, several parties and interests can be 
somewhat satisfied…[because] neither party has their needs fully met, but neither 
is anyone left completely satisfied.” 
If stakeholders assume corporate decisions increase the likelihood of the underlying 
corresponding actions, those who might benefit from such a decision may express strong 
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support even though firms have not taken any action. In contrast, those concerned with other 
issues may express their strong objections. Nevertheless, the opposition is only present in 
emoticons but not reflected in stakeholders’ comments, and we observe a higher likelihood of 
receiving positive rather than negative reactions. Overall, it appears that CSR talk and decisions 
disclosures on Facebook do allow firms to maintain legitimacy by mitigating negative concerns 
over CSR actions disclosure.  
Further, when we look at whether there is a greater stakeholder reaction towards CSR 
actions disclosures than talk and decisions disclosures (H3), the results show that actions 
disclosures not only receive more positive stakeholder reactions, but also more negative ones 
than talk and decisions disclosures. Combing this finding with the findings from the previous 
two sets of hypotheses, our empirical evidence supports the arguments of organized hypocrisy 
theory, which predicts that talk and decisions can indeed gain a related value and partially meet 
stakeholders’ divergent interests (Brunsson, 2007), and corroborates prior literature suggesting 
that actions disclosures are more credible (Mercer, 2004). Actions disclosures attract much 
debate from stakeholders, while talk and decisions can gain stakeholders’ support and ease 
negative perceptions. Overall, our study shows that hypocrisy strategies in social media shape 
how firms maintain legitimacy from stakeholder groups with conflicting interests. 
With respect to organizational façades, in line with Cho et al. (2015) arguments, we 
document that the progressive façade is more likely than the other two façades to generate 
extreme reactions. Although most CSR posts on Facebook erect reputational façades to 
positively affect stakeholder perceptions and reduce negative reactions, we also document the 
presence of progressive façades in social media, suggesting firms may be aware that the mere 
use of reputational façades could result in organized hypocrisy being exposed, hence requiring 
a demonstration of progress to reduce the chance of engaging in meta-hypocrisy (Brunsson, 
2007; Cho et al., 2015).  
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Finally, we document that firms are more likely to reply to stakeholders when there is 
a high intensity of comments and when these comments are more positive. On one side, the 
presence of several comments may make the post more visible, and hence the firm’s reply 
could be functional to reduce the risk of exposing the hypocrisy. On the other side, the fact that 
replies are more likely in the presence of positive comments contrasts with prior CSR 
disclosure research (e.g. Patten, 1992) arguing that, in the presence of negative exposure, firms 
are likely to respond with more information to restore legitimacy. However, consistent with 
prior studies on stakeholder engagement in social media (Gómez-Carrasco et al., 2017; Manetti 
& Bellucci, 2016), firms do not appear to engage with stakeholders. Once most of the 
stakeholders have expressed consent over a post, those who have criticisms tend to be ignored 
by firms, supporting the idea that social media are used as a tool to manage stakeholder 
perceptions rather than to engage with stakeholders.  
As Cho et al. (2015) discuss in their study, whether organized hypocrisy and 
organizational façades bring any beneficial change to the firms and the wider society is still 
questionable. We note that while social media have transformed political engagement models 
and legitimation processes, the effects of these changes for the wider public interest are still 
unclear. We have moved from an institutional-based model, where media journalists act as 
gatekeepers for the production and dissemination of information, to an individualistic-based 
one, where the advent of social media has shifted the responsibility to promote a well-
functioning democratic society to individual users (Napoli, 2015). Within this individualistic 
model and through the dissemination of information in social media, marginalized stakeholders 
potentially are granted an increased power in expressing their negative concerns about firm 
practices to a wider public. In response, firms may disclose more talk, decisions, and actions 
regarding corporate CSR practices to ease stakeholder concerns, hence leading to an enhanced 
accountability. While the presence of negative reactions in our study may suggest this is the 
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case, the high likelihood of talk, decisions, and actions disclosures still receiving positive 
reactions, together with firms’ selective reply practices, instead suggest the power between 
stakeholders and corporations is still unbalanced (West, 2017).  
Our study opens several avenues for future research. First, enhanced accountability can 
only be established under a pro-active stakeholder engagement approach (Bebbington, Brown, 
Frame, & Thomson, 2007; Brown, 2009; Brown & Dillard, 2013; Thomson & Bebbington, 
2005). Our findings suggest that social media engagement is still largely a one-way 
communication and lacks a true dialogue, as stakeholders’ concerns and criticisms are often 
neglected (Colleoni, 2013; Gómez-Carrasco et al., 2017; Manetti & Bellucci, 2016; Unerman 
& Bennett, 2004). Why that is the case, we can only speculate, but one possibility is that CSR 
posts in social media are intended for other corporate goals rather than maintain legitimacy. 
For example, the vast amount of big data generated by social media allows corporations to 
collect, analyze, and utilize digital traces of the identities, opinions, and potential intended 
behaviors of these stakeholders, which in turn can be used for decision-making and potential 
commercialization (Flyverbom, Deibert, & Matten, 2017). As “Big Brother” meets “Big Data”, 
we are now experiencing a system of data capitalism (Flyverbom et al., 2017; West, 2017). By 
establishing a presence in social media, corporations give an illusion that they are improving 
transparency, establishing a community, and engaging with stakeholders, yet in fact, they may 
be using such information to exercise social controls, creating information asymmetry, 
influencing perceptions, and commoditizing audiences (West, 2017). We call upon future 
research to explore these issues. 
Second, the use of big data for managing stakeholder perceptions in social media also 
raises an accountability problem itself. Due to the large volume and velocity of unstructured 
data involved, algorithms are used to accurately and efficiently identify trends, make 
predictions, and select relevant information for decision-making (Vedder & Naudts, 2017). 
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Since algorithms decide which information is relevant for each audience, firms are also held 
accountable towards stakeholders and the public regarding the algorithm used in decision-
making (Martin, 2018). In the social media context, the algorithm plays an influential role in 
disseminating CSR disclosures to stakeholder homepages, influencing perceptions, and 
informing firms on their legitimacy status. In this case, social media algorithms may feed one 
stakeholder with contents that share similar characteristics with those she previously reacted 
to, for example, a “like” reaction to a corporate talk can make the algorithm feed more 
corporate talk. Firms may exploit such automatized processes to bias the dissemination of 
information towards corporate talk and decisions in pursuit for legitimacy while disclosing less 
information regarding corporate actions to the most concerned stakeholders, identified as those 
with the most negative reactions, and feeding them with talk and decisions to prevent the 
negativity turning into outrage. The lack of transparency on social media algorithms may 
hinder the process of stakeholder engagement and transparency on CSR issues. As scholars are 
calling for more accountability on corporate social media operations (Kemper & Kolkman, 
2018; Napoli, 2015), future accounting research may examine how firms address their 
algorithm-related accountability towards stakeholders.  
Third, although firms are actively exploiting social media algorithm to manage 
stakeholder perceptions, studies also suggest that social media are still crucial platforms for 
challenging organizational legitimacy (Etter et al., 2018) and generating public interest 
outcomes when collective voices arise (Gómez-Carrasco & Michelon, 2017). Since 
marginalized individual stakeholders may find it difficult to put pressure on firms, they often 
form collective actions to reduce the power imbalance. Nevertheless, even if a large group of 
stakeholders was formed through social media, they would still face obstacles such as lack of 
resources, threats of repression, and pluralistic ignorance where people are free-riding other 
stakeholders (Daudigeos, Roulet, & Valiorgue, 2018). As a result, the formation of collective 
  37 
actions and the generation of real impacts from social media activism may be conditional on 
the presence of a catalyst event, which exposes firm hypocrisy, or on the leadership of 
organized bodies, such as NGOs or trade unions (Gómez-Carrasco & Michelon, 2017; Guo & 
Saxton, 2018). While this may be the case, whether social media can actually lead to 
stakeholder mobilization is an open question (Quinn, Lynn, Jollands, & Nair, 2016). Future 
research may examine how advocacy groups or stakeholders are forming collective actions 
using social media and whether the employment of social media collective power may lead to 
any improvement on CSR accountability and real changes in corporate policies. 
Finally, we note that our study is not without limitations. First, we assume that the users 
in social media are the firms’ stakeholders and their reactions reflect their perceptions towards 
firms’ disclosures. However, we cannot identify the profiles of these stakeholders. Furthermore, 
firms may disclose different strategies depending on the importance of stakeholders (Brunsson, 
2007). Future studies could conduct case studies to explore how different stakeholder groups 
perceive hypocrisy strategies and how firms select strategies according to a stakeholder’s 
salience level (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997). Second, our study only focuses on a single 
social media platform (i.e. Facebook). As Cho et al. (2015) suggest, firms try to erect discrepant 
façades across various platforms, for example, in annual reports, CSR reports, corporate 
websites, Twitter, YouTube, Facebook, and so on. Therefore, future research could use case 
studies to assess hypocrisy across different CSR communication platforms. Third, our study 
cannot differentiate accounts operated by firms or by outsourced PR agencies. Third-party PR 
agencies may employ sophisticated sentiment monitoring software to maintain a high level of 
positive reactions. As a result, they may not pay attention to criticism and instead emphasize 
the positive sentiment. Future studies could explore how corporate (or third-party PR firms’) 
social media officers are engaging with their (or their clients’) stakeholders.   
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Figure 1. Theoretical Framework 
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Table 1. Variables measurement 
 
 Variable name Definition 
Stakeholder reactions 
Number of likes Likes The total number of likes for each post message 
Number of shares Shares The total number of shares for each post message 
Number of comments Comments The total number of comments for each post message 
Love reaction Love Dummy variable equals to 1 if there is at least one love 
reaction to each post message, and 0 otherwise 
Wow reaction Wow Dummy variable equals to 1 if there is at least one wow 
reaction to each post message, and 0 otherwise 
Haha reaction Haha Dummy variable equals to 1 if there is at least one haha 
reaction to each post message, and 0 otherwise 
Sad reaction Sad Dummy variable equals to 1 if there is at least one sad 
reaction to each post message, and 0 otherwise 
Angry reaction Angry Dummy variable equals to 1 if there is at least one angry 
reaction to each post message, and 0 otherwise 
Positive comment PosComment Dummy variable equals to 1 if there is at least one 
positive comment to each post message, and 0 otherwise 
Negative comment NegComment Dummy variable equals to 1 if there is at least one 
negative comment to each post message, and 0 otherwise 
Independent variables 
Actions disclosure CSR_Act Dummy variable equals to 1 if the post discloses actions 
information, and 0 otherwise. 
Talk disclosure CSR_Talk Dummy variable equals to 1 if the post discloses talk 
information, and 0 otherwise. 
Decisions disclosure CSR_Decision Dummy variable equals to 1 if the post discloses 
decisions information, and 0 otherwise. 
Control variables 
Length of the post Character_log The log transformation of the number of characters 
(without space) in each post message 
Use of Hyperlinks URL Dummy variable equals to 1 if the post contains a 
hyperlink (i.e. "http://") 
Use of Hashtags Hashtag Dummy variable equals to 1 if the post contains a hashtag 
followed by words (i.e. "#*") 
Presence of photos and 
videos 
Visuals Dummy variable equals to 1 if the post contains a photo 
or video 
Firm size Size The log transformation of firm's quarterly total assets 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics  
 
  N. Mean SD Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
         
General reactions         
Likes 21,166 1,183.67 10,610.36 0 31 93 317 447,450 
Shares 21,166 181.23 1,604.01 0 3 13 48 94,787 
Comments 21,166 53.84 422.59 0 1 5 20 35,533 
Specific reactions         
Love 21,166 0.674 0.469 0 0 1 1 1 
Wow 21,166 0.397 0.489 0 0 0 1 1 
Haha 21,166 0.242 0.428 0 0 0 0 1 
Sad 21,166 0.125 0.330 0 0 0 0 1 
Angry 21,166 0.249 0.432 0 0 0 0 1 
PosComment 21,166 0.637 0.481 0 0 1 1 1 
NegComment 21,166 0.435 0.496 0 0 0 1 1 
Independent variables        
CSR_Act 21,166 0.08 0.28 0 0 0 0 1 
CSR_Talk 21,166 0.22 0.41 0 0 0 0 1 
CSR_Decision 21,166 0.03 0.17 0 0 0 0 1 
Control variables         
Character_log 21,166 4.84 1.09 0 4.691 4.997 5.338 8.719 
Visuals 21,166 0.7 0.46 0 0 1 1 1 
URL 21,166 0.47 0.5 0 0 0 1 1 
Hashtag 21,166 0.36 0.48 0 0 0 1 1 
Size 21,166 11.44 1.12 9.435 10.535 11.418 12.001 14.75 
                  
All variables are defined in Table 1. 
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Table 3. Correlation matrix 
No VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 Likes 1         
2 Shares 0.333*** 1        
3 Comments 0.256*** 0.609*** 1       
4 Love 0.075*** 0.076*** 0.082*** 1      
5 Wow 0.126*** 0.126*** 0.131*** 0.444*** 1     
6 Haha 0.171*** 0.165*** 0.183*** 0.344*** 0.438*** 1    
7 Sad 0.219*** 0.204*** 0.220*** 0.230*** 0.346*** 0.430*** 1   
8 Angry 0.144*** 0.135*** 0.168*** 0.247*** 0.270*** 0.390*** 0.377*** 1  
9 PosComment 0.078*** 0.080*** 0.091*** 0.443*** 0.407*** 0.351*** 0.240*** 0.316*** 1 
10 NegComment 0.108*** 0.110*** 0.132*** 0.333*** 0.378*** 0.427*** 0.329*** 0.449*** 0.520*** 
11 CSR_Act 0.030*** -0.005 -0.01 0.031*** 0.028*** -0.004 0.032*** 0.003 0.006 
12 CSR_Talk -0.037*** -0.041*** -0.051*** -0.067*** -0.139*** -0.148*** -0.086*** -0.126*** -0.133*** 
13 CSR_Decision 0.011 -0.009 -0.014* -0.033*** -0.037*** -0.038*** -0.020** -0.019** -0.043*** 
14 Character_log 0.007 -0.019** -0.011 -0.061*** -0.029*** -0.051*** -0.023*** -0.075*** -0.038*** 
15 Visuals 0.037*** 0.048*** 0.054*** 0.137*** 0.129*** 0.112*** 0.063*** 0.052*** 0.135*** 
16 URL 0.008 -0.030*** -0.027*** -0.084*** -0.035*** -0.069*** -0.058*** -0.119*** -0.084*** 
17 Hashtag 0.020** 0.01 0.005 -0.069*** -0.092*** -0.033*** -0.014* -0.031*** -0.085*** 
18 Size 0.034*** -0.020** 0.004 0.092*** -0.005 0.036*** 0.009 0.116*** 0.160*** 
           
No VARIABLES 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 Likes          
2 Shares          
3 Comments          
4 Love          
5 Wow          
6 Haha          
7 Sad          
8 Angry          
9 PosComment          
10 NegComment 1         
11 CSR_Act -0.01 1        
12 CSR_Talk -0.175*** -0.161*** 1       
13 CSR_Decision -0.036*** -0.054*** -0.096*** 1      
14 Character_log -0.053*** 0.136*** 0.168*** 0.084*** 1     
15 Visuals 0.109*** 0.024*** -0.061*** -0.035*** -0.014* 1    
16 URL -0.109*** -0.025*** 0.002 0.015* 0.254*** 0.060*** 1   
17 Hashtag -0.071*** 0.037*** 0.078*** 0.021** 0.151*** 0.098*** 0 1  
18 Size 0.126*** 0.007 -0.004 0.020** 0.004 0.074*** -0.075*** -0.020** 1 
All variables are defined in Table 1. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
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Table 4. Stakeholder reactions to CSR hypocrisy disclosures  
 
Panel A. Negative binomial regression between general reactions and CSR talk, decision and actions 
disclosures 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Likes Shares Comments 
        
CSR_Act 0.872*** 0.555*** 0.461*** 
 (0.089) (0.076) (0.069) 
CSR_Talk -0.058 -0.132** -0.256*** 
 (0.055) (0.056) (0.053) 
CSR_Decision -0.003 0.025 -0.221** 
 (0.113) (0.102) (0.097) 
Character_log 0.057*** 0.208*** 0.126*** 
 (0.016) (0.025) (0.017) 
Visuals 0.379*** 0.396*** 0.505*** 
 (0.047) (0.046) (0.041) 
URL -0.108** -0.294*** -0.260*** 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.047) 
Hashtag 0.108** 0.076 0.142*** 
 (0.049) (0.050) (0.047) 
Size 0.627 0.419 0.300 
 (0.424) (0.478) (0.435) 
Constant -5.241 -3.772 -4.563 
 (4.697) (5.298) (4.834) 
    
Observations 21,166 21,166 21,166 
Firm FE YES YES YES 
Week FE YES YES YES 
pseudo-R-squared 0.076 0.089 0.117 
Chi-square test 21,365 13,014 14,639 
Probe > chi2 0 0 0 
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Panel B. Logit regression between specific reactions and CSR talk, decision and actions disclosures  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Love Wow Haha Sad Angry PosComment NegComment 
  
       
CSR_Act 1.118*** 0.711*** 0.410*** 0.690*** 0.614*** 0.652*** 0.361*** 
 (0.078) (0.071) (0.077) (0.088) (0.081) (0.070) (0.072) 
CSR_Talk 0.365*** -0.243*** -0.384*** -0.212*** -0.133** 0.081 -0.276*** 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.063) (0.077) (0.065) (0.050) (0.054) 
CSR_Decision 0.277** -0.106 -0.190 -0.143 0.269** 0.052 -0.136 
 (0.109) (0.109) (0.132) (0.156) (0.134) (0.100) (0.114) 
Character_log -0.075*** 0.049*** 0.030 0.027 -0.045** 0.064*** 0.065*** 
 (0.021) (0.019) (0.020) (0.026) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) 
Visuals 0.460*** 0.376*** 0.425*** 0.157** 0.140** 0.267*** 0.200*** 
 (0.048) (0.045) (0.053) (0.063) (0.055) (0.044) (0.046) 
URL -0.295*** -0.137*** -0.177*** -0.090 -0.040 -0.189*** -0.124** 
 (0.050) (0.046) (0.051) (0.059) (0.054) (0.047) (0.048) 
Hashtag 0.198*** 0.037 0.139*** 0.104* 0.006 0.007 0.010 
 (0.044) (0.043) (0.047) (0.057) (0.049) (0.042) (0.044) 
Size 0.171 0.919** 1.416*** 1.608*** 3.100*** -0.689* 0.297 
 (0.437) (0.384) (0.461) (0.532) (0.509) (0.412) (0.481) 
Constant -4.519 -10.216** -19.709*** -21.026*** -36.158*** 6.191 -1.568 
 (4.884) (5.005) (5.885) (6.776) (6.539) (4.602) (6.157) 
 
       
Observations(1) 20,705 20,620 20,653 20,396 20,730 20,450 20,938 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Week FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
pseudo-R-
squared 
0.348 0.286 0.262 0.211 0.349 0.301 0.342 
Chi-square test 4,607 5,079 3,815 2,327 4,086 4,609 5,080 
Prob > chi2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(1) We lose some observations when regressing each type of specific reactions because STATA automatically 
omits observations that predict failure perfectly. 
Table 4 reports the results on stakeholder reactions to organized hypocrisy disclosure strategies used in Facebook 
posts. Panel A presents the results from regressing the number of likes (column 1), the number of shares (column 
2), and the number of comments (column 3) for each post on the organized hypocrisy disclosure strategy (talk, 
decisions, or actions) used in the post. The table reports negative binomial coefficient estimates and (in brackets) 
robust standard errors. Panel B presents the results from regressing the likelihood of receiving at least one ‘love’ 
emoticon (column 1), a ‘wow’ emoticon (column 2), a ‘haha’ emoticon (column 3), a ‘sad’ emoticon (column 4), 
an ‘angry’ emoticon (column 5), a positive comment (column 6), or a negative comment (column 7) in each post 
on the organized hypocrisy disclosure strategy (talk, decision, or action) used in the post. The table reports logistic 
coefficient estimates and (in brackets) robust standard errors.  All variables are defined in Table 1. *, **, and *** 
represent significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 5. Intensity of stakeholder reaction to CSR hypocrisy disclosures 
Panel A. Negative binomial regressions between general reactions and actions disclosures in CSR 
posts 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Likes Shares Comments 
        
CSR_Act 0.933*** 0.795*** 0.765*** 
 (0.056) (0.056) (0.054) 
    
Observations 7,104 7,104 7,104 
Controls YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES 
Week FE YES YES YES 
pseudo-R-squared 0.115 0.103 0.131 
 
 
Panel B. Logit regressions between specific reactions and hypocrisy actions disclosures in CSR posts 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Love Wow Haha Sad Angry PosComment NegComment 
                
CSR_Act 0.886*** 0.996*** 0.857*** 0.958*** 0.764*** 0.597*** 0.715*** 
 (0.081) (0.072) (0.085) (0.100) (0.089) (0.071) (0.075) 
        
Observations(1) 6,927 6,886 6,691 6,554 6,572 6,874 6,876 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Week FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
pseudo-R-squared 0.316 0.247 0.248 0.225 0.312 0.240 0.294 
Chi-square test 1,653 1,344 1,020 738.1 1,126 1,407 1,507 
Prob > chi2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(1) We lose some observations when regressing each type of specific reactions because STATA automatically 
omits observations that predict failure perfectly. 
Table 5 reports the results for the intensity of stakeholder reactions to actions disclosures in CSR posts. Panel A 
presents the results from regressing the number of likes (column 1), the number of shares (column 2), and the 
number of comments (column 3) in each CSR post on the hypocrisy action strategy used in the post. The table 
reports negative binomial coefficient estimates and (in brackets) robust standard errors, where the baseline effect 
is the effect of hypocrisy talk and decisions disclosure strategies on each stakeholder general reaction. Panel B 
presents the results from regressing the likelihood of receiving a ‘love’ emoticon (column 1), a ‘wow’ emoticon 
(column 2), a ‘haha’ emoticon (column 3), a ‘sad’ emoticon (column 4), an ‘angry’ emoticon (column 5), a 
positive comment (column 6), and a negative comment (column 7) in each post on the hypocrisy action strategy 
used in the post. The table reports logistic coefficient estimates and (in brackets) robust standard errors, where the 
baseline effect is the effect of hypocrisy talk and decisions disclosure strategies on each stakeholder general 
reaction. Control variables are omitted for brevity and are the same as in Table 4. All variables are defined in 
Table 1. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 6. Stakeholder Reactions and Façade Strategies in CSR Posts 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES Likes Shares Comments Love Wow Haha Sad Angry PosComment NegComment 
           
Progressive 0.167** 0.080 0.073 0.393*** 0.286** -0.009 0.223 0.028 -0.122 -0.036 
 (0.080) (0.095) (0.092) (0.134) (0.135) (0.181) (0.224) (0.158) (0.118) (0.130) 
Reputational -0.003 -0.129 -0.129 0.393*** -0.061 -0.060 -0.090 -0.447*** -0.147 -0.403*** 
 (0.076) (0.090) (0.084) (0.127) (0.130) (0.178) (0.221) (0.152) (0.111) (0.124) 
Character_log 0.158*** 0.097** 0.232*** 0.023 0.109 0.031 0.219** -0.119 0.232*** 0.127 
 (0.043) (0.048) (0.053) (0.073) (0.072) (0.086) (0.101) (0.097) (0.070) (0.078) 
Visuals 0.223*** 0.283*** 0.386*** 0.301*** 0.365*** 0.152 0.038 0.083 0.180** 0.174** 
 (0.054) (0.057) (0.056) (0.080) (0.076) (0.094) (0.109) (0.096) (0.070) (0.077) 
URL -0.202*** -0.171*** -0.074 -0.308*** -0.126 -0.126 -0.073 0.113 -0.210*** 0.009 
 (0.054) (0.055) (0.055) (0.081) (0.077) (0.098) (0.109) (0.096) (0.073) (0.081) 
Hashtag 0.102** 0.176*** 0.198*** 0.094 -0.067 0.171* 0.121 -0.012 -0.013 0.037 
 (0.051) (0.058) (0.058) (0.072) (0.073) (0.097) (0.115) (0.094) (0.067) (0.078) 
Size -0.022 0.196 0.017 0.291 0.737 -0.097 0.528 2.591*** 0.044 0.182 
 (0.409) (0.480) (0.507) (0.630) (0.560) (0.732) (0.972) (0.893) (0.547) (0.683) 
Constant 2.308 -0.086 -1.616 -5.130 -10.419 -0.093 -7.324 -33.630*** -3.770 -2.508 
 (4.551) (5.321) (5.608) (7.029) (7.168) (9.372) (12.323) (11.414) (6.123) (8.726) 
           
Observations(1) 7,104 7,104 7,104 6,927 6,886 6,691 6,554 6,572 6,874 6,876 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Week FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
pseudo-R-squared 0.107 0.0967 0.123 0.303 0.228 0.231 0.206 0.304 0.233 0.287 
           
           
           
Within Regression F Test           
Progressive = Reputational 9.96*** 13.80*** 13.02*** 0.00 22.59*** 0.31 8.42*** 26.50*** 0.14 22.61*** 
 
(1) We lose some observations when regressing each type of specific reactions because STATA automatically omits observations that predict failure perfectly. 
 52 
Table 6 reports the results on the stakeholder general and specific reactions to façade disclosure strategies that firms used in CSR posts. Column 1 to 3 present the results from 
regressing the number of likes (column 1), the number of shares (column 2), and the number of comments (column 3) in each CSR post on the progressive (Progressive) and 
reputational (Reputational) façade strategies used in the post using negative binomial model. Column 4 to 10 present the results from regressing the likelihood of receiving a 
‘love’ emoticon (column 1), a ‘wow’ emoticon (column 2), a ‘haha’ emoticon (column 3), a ‘sad’ emoticon (column 4), an ‘angry’ emoticon (column 5), a positive comment 
(column 6), and a negative comment (column 7) in each CSR post on the progressive (Progressive) and reputational (Reputational) strategies used in the post using the logit 
model. Column 1 to 3 report negative binomial coefficient estimates and (in brackets) robust standard errors, and Column 4 to 10 report logistic coefficient estimates and (in 
brackets) robust standard errors. The baseline for all models is the effect of rational façade strategy on each type of stakeholder reactions. Progressive is a dummy variable 
equals 1 if the post is trying to erect a CSR progressive facade, and 0 otherwise. Reputational is a dummy variable equals 1 if the post is trying to erect a CSR reputational 
facade, and 0 otherwise. All other variables are defined in Table 1. Post-estimation F test was performed to test the null hypothesis that the coefficient estimates between 
Progressive and Reputational are equal. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 7. Firm post-disclosure replies to stakeholder reactions    
 
(1) 
Actions disclosure 
(2) 
Talk & Decisions disclosure 
VARIABLES Reply Reply 
   
Emotion_Sentiment -0.130 0.241* 
 (0.270) (0.132) 
Comment_Sentiment 0.417* 0.358*** 
 (0.221) (0.121) 
Emotions_log -0.0224 -0.202*** 
 (0.137) (0.0701) 
Comments_log 0.962*** 1.180*** 
 (0.146) (0.0799) 
Constant -5.964*** -4.931*** 
 (1.566) (0.992) 
   
Observations 1,316 4,611 
Firm FE YES YES 
Week FE YES YES 
pseudo-R-squared 0.441 0.386 
Log-Likelihood Full Model -430.8 -1290 
Chi-square test 460.9 1044 
Prob > chi2 0 0 
 
Table 7 reports the likelihood of firms’ post-disclosure replies to stakeholder comments under each CSR post, for 
respectively actions disclosure posts (column 1) and talk and decisions disclosure posts (column 2), regressed on 
the sentiment level of stakeholder specific reactions (Emotion_Sentiment), the sentiment of stakeholder comments 
(Comment_Sentiment), the intensity of stakeholder reactions (Emotions_log), and the intensity of stakeholder 
comments (Comments_log). The table reports logistic coefficient estimates and (in brackets) robust standard 
errors. Reply is a dummy variable equals to 1 when a firm replies to at least one comment under a post. 
Emotion_Sentiment measures the sentiment level of stakeholder specific reactions (excluding 'likes') after reading 
a post and it is computed using the Janis-Fadner coefficient of imbalance between the number of positive ('love', 
'wow', and 'haha) and negative ('sad' and 'angry') emoticons. Comment_Sentiment measures the sentiment of 
stakeholder comments after reading a post, and it is calculated using Janis-Fadner coefficient between the number 
of positive and negative comments. Emotion_log measures the intensity of stakeholder reactions as the log 
transformation of the number of reactions (the sum of likes, loves, hahas, wows, sads, and angrys) under each 
post. Comments_log measures the intensity of stakeholder comments as the log transformation of the number of 
comments under each post. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 (two-tailed), 
respectively. 
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Appendix A. List of Sample Firms 
 
Firm Ticker Industry Sector Observations % 
     
AbbVie Inc. ABBV Biotechnology 66 0.31 
Abbott Laboratories ABT Healthcare Equipment 224 1.06 
Accenture plc ACN IT Consulting and Other Services 610 2.88 
American International Group, Inc. AIG Multi-line Insurance 370 1.75 
The Allstate Corporation ALL Property and Casualty Insurance 403 1.9 
Amazon.com, Inc. AMZN Internet and Direct Marketing Retail 771 3.64 
American Express Company AXP Consumer Finance 185 0.87 
The Boeing Company BA Aerospace and Defence 103 0.49 
Bank of America Corporation BAC Diversified Banks 568 2.68 
Biogen Inc. BIIB Biotechnology 160 0.76 
The Bank of New York Mellon 
Corporation 
BK Asset Management and Custody Banks 172 0.81 
BlackRock, Inc. BLK Asset Management and Custody Banks 28 0.13 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company BMY Pharmaceuticals 201 0.95 
Citigroup Inc. C Diversified Banks 85 0.4 
Caterpillar Inc. CAT Construction Machinery and Heavy 
Trucks 
214 1.01 
Celgene Corporation CELG Biotechnology 208 0.98 
Comcast Corporation CMCSA Cable and Satellite 61 0.29 
Capital One Financial Corporation COF Consumer Finance 161 0.76 
ConocoPhillips COP Oil and Gas Exploration and Production 157 0.74 
Costco Wholesale Corporation COST Hypermarkets and Super Centers 586 2.77 
Cisco Systems, Inc. CSCO Communications Equipment 641 3.03 
CVS Health Corporation CVS Drug Retail 8 0.04 
Chevron Corporation CVX Integrated Oil and Gas 168 0.79 
E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company DD Diversified Chemicals 139 0.66 
The Walt Disney Company DIS Movies and Entertainment 304 1.44 
The Dow Chemical Company DOW Diversified Chemicals 197 0.93 
Duke Energy Corporation DUK Electric Utilities 479 2.26 
Emerson Electric Co. EMR Electrical Components and Equipment 235 1.11 
Ford Motor Company F Automobile Manufacturers 246 1.16 
Facebook, Inc. FB Internet Software and Services 5 0.02 
FedEx Corporation FDX Air Freight and Logistics 151 0.71 
Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. FOXA Movies and Entertainment 212 1 
General Electric Company GE Industrial Conglomerates 427 2.02 
General Motors Company GM Automobile Manufacturers 265 1.25 
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. GS Investment Banking and Brokerage 74 0.35 
Halliburton Company HAL Oil and Gas Equipment and Services 280 1.32 
The Home Depot, Inc. HD Home Improvement Retail 132 0.62 
International Business Machines 
Corporation 
IBM IT Consulting and Other Services 280 1.32 
Intel Corporation INTC Semiconductors 495 2.34 
Johnson & Johnson JNJ Pharmaceuticals 183 0.86 
JPMorgan Chase & Co. JPM Diversified Banks 154 0.73 
The Kraft Heinz Company KHC Packaged Foods and Meats 708 3.34 
Kinder Morgan, Inc. KMI Oil and Gas Storage and Transportation 195 0.92 
The Coca-Cola Company KO Soft Drinks 228 1.08 
Eli Lilly and Company LLY Pharmaceuticals 383 1.81 
Lockheed Martin Corporation LMT Aerospace and Defence 588 2.78 
Lowe's Companies, Inc. LOW Home Improvement Retail 185 0.87 
Mastercard Incorporated MA Data Processing and Outsourced 
Services 
268 1.27 
Mondelez International, Inc. MDLZ Packaged Foods and Meats 152 0.72 
Medtronic plc MDT Healthcare Equipment 116 0.55 
MetLife, Inc. MET Life and Health Insurance 131 0.62 
3M Company MMM Industrial Conglomerates 194 0.92 
Monsanto Company MON Fertilizers and Agricultural Chemicals 235 1.11 
Merck & Co., Inc. MRK Pharmaceuticals 466 2.2 
Microsoft Corporation MSFT Systems Software 692 3.27 
NextEra Energy, Inc. NEE Electric Utilities 22 0.1 
NIKE, Inc. NKE Footwear 53 0.25 
Oracle Corporation ORCL Systems Software 465 2.2 
The Priceline Group Inc. PCLN Internet and Direct Marketing Retail 183 0.86 
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Pepsico, Inc. PEP Soft Drinks 168 0.79 
Pfizer Inc. PFE Pharmaceuticals 688 3.25 
PayPal Holdings, Inc. PYPL Data Processing and Outsourced 
Services 
49 0.23 
QUALCOMM Incorporated QCOM Semiconductors 185 0.87 
Raytheon Company RTN Aerospace and Defence 607 2.87 
Starbucks Corporation SBUX Restaurants 22 0.1 
The Southern Company SO Electric Utilities 233 1.1 
Simon Property Group, Inc. SPG Retail REITs 185 0.87 
AT&T Inc. T Integrated Telecommunication Services 339 1.6 
Target Corporation TGT General Merchandise Stores 84 0.4 
Time Warner Inc. TWX Movies and Entertainment 237 1.12 
Texas Instruments Incorporated TXN Semiconductors 679 3.21 
UnitedHealth Group Incorporated UNH Managed Healthcare 206 0.97 
Union Pacific Corporation UNP Railroads 257 1.21 
United Parcel Service, Inc. UPS Air Freight and Logistics 145 0.69 
U.S. Bancorp USB Diversified Banks 217 1.03 
United Technologies Corporation UTX Aerospace and Defence 200 0.94 
Verizon Communications Inc. VZ Integrated Telecommunication Services 180 0.85 
Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc. WBA Drug Retail 536 2.53 
Wells Fargo & Company WFC Diversified Banks 101 0.48 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. WMT Hypermarkets and Super Centers 112 0.53 
Exxon Mobil Corporation XOM Integrated Oil and Gas 64 0.3 
Total   21,166 100 
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Appendix B. Dictionary for Identifying CSR Posts 
 
Categories Lexicons 
Environmental air; animal; animals; bees; benthos; bionomics; bioclimatic; biodegradable; biodiversities; 
biodiversity; biogenic; biome; bioremediation; biosphere; bird; birds; carbon; carcinogenic; 
cfc; clean; cleaner; cleanest; cleaning; cleans; climate; co2; composting; conservancy; 
conservation; conservationist; conservations; contaminate; contamination; cooling; deforest; 
deforests; desertification; dioxides; discharge; discharges; earth; ecologies; ecology; 
ecosystem; ecosystems; effluents; electricities; electricity; emission; emissions; endangered; 
energy; environment; environmental; eutrophic; eutrophication; extinction; fish; footprint; 
footprints; forest; forests; gas; gases; ghg; green; ground; habitat; habitats; heating; heatings; 
hydric; incineration; insect; insects; lake; lakes; landfill; marine; material; materials; msc; 
natural; nature; nitrogen; nuclear; ocean; oceans; ods; oxides; ozone; ozonsphere; pathogens; 
pests; planet; pollutants; pollute; pollutes; pollution; protected; rainwater; recyclable; recycle; 
recycled; recycles; recycling; rehabilitate; rehabilitates; remediation; renew; renewable; 
renews; reserve; reserves; reused; river; rivers; solar; species; steam; sulfur; sustainability; 
sustainable; toxic; unforest; warming; waste; water; wetlands; wildlife 
  
Diversity african; black; chinese; discriminate; discrimination; diverse; diversity; equal; equality; 
ethnic; ethnicdiversity; ethnicity; female; females; feminine; gender; genderdiversity; girl; 
girls; indian; jew; lady; male; males; man; men; minorities; minority; negro; racial; sex; 
sexual; woman; women; woman; women 
  
Human Rights biased; child; dictator; disability; disable; discrimination; forced; freedom; gay; gays; 
genocide; homosexual; human; inclusion; inclusive; indigenous; labor; labour; lesbian; 
lesbians; lgbt; lgbtq; prejudice; pride; racism; rights; slave; slavery 
  
Employees bargaining; benefits; care; career; careers; collective; compensate; compensated; 
compensation; compensations; crew; crews; development; developments; disease; diseases; 
employ; employabilities; employability; employee; employees; employment; employments; 
engagement; engagements; fatalities; health; injuries; injury; intern; internship; internships; 
involvement; involvements; job; jobs; labor; labour; maternal; maternity; occupation; 
occupational; paid; parental; paternal; paternity; pay; pays; profession; professional; 
remunerated; remuneration; remunerations; retire; retirement; safe; safety; salaries; salary; 
satisfaction; skill; skills; staff; team; teams; training; trainings; unions; wage; wages; welfare; 
worker; workers; working conditions; workplace; workplaces 
  
Community aids; charitable; charities; charity; communities; community; contribute; contribution; 
contributions; donate; donated; donation; donations; educate; education; education; 
educational; educations; engagement; famine; fight; fund; funding; funds; hunger; local; 
medical; medicine; medicines; malnutrition; obesities; obesity; people; philanthropic; 
philanthropy; poverty; public; school; schools; social; societal; society; sponsor; sponsored; 
sponsoring; sponsorship; stem; student; students; veteran; veterans; voluntary; volunteer; 
volunteered; volunteering; volunteers; welfare 
  
Product product; products; service; services; recalls; components; component; production; process; 
raw; testing; tests; test; customer; customers; privacy; confidentiality; confidential; quality; 
qualities; client; clients 
  
Governance accountability; accountable; acquisition; annual; corrupt; corruption; csr; disclosure; 
disclosures; ethic; ethical; ethics; governance; gri; guideline; guidelines; market; missions; 
performance; policies; policy; board; directors; ceo; report; reporting; reports; strategies; 
strategy; transparency; transparent; visions; volatility; citizen; citizens; citizenship; 
citizenships; responsibilities; responsibility; political 
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Appendix C. Guidelines on Coding Organized Hypocrisy Strategies (and Organizational Façades) 
 
Organized Hypocrisy Coding Guidelines 
Talk 
• The message shows a statement on company’s commitments, visions, 
missions, goals, and values regarding its economic, social, and 
environmental issues. 
• The message shows a quote from a stakeholder of organization (e.g. 
managers, employees, or customers etc.) regarding company’s economic, 
social, and environmental issues. 
• The message shows past experience or a story of a stakeholder of 
organization (e.g. managers, employees, or customers etc.) regarding 
company’s economic, social, and environmental issues. 
• The message shows an organizational activity without supplying details 
such as parties involved, time, location, contents of activities, quantitative 
measures 
• The message demonstrates a history of activities done by the organization. 
• The message invites stakeholders to participate in the conversation. 
• The message is often written in present tense. 
• Keywords example: committed, commitments, vision, mission, goal, 
value, believe, recognize, acknowledge, emphasize, understand, know, 
aware, always, why, say, speak, talk, etc. 
Decisions 
• The message shows an organization’s decisions on economic, social, and 
environmental policies, strategies, and practices. 
• The message shows an organization’s activity that is scheduled in the 
future. The message often contains a future date and time. 
• The message outlines an organization objective or targets for the future 
• The message is often written in future tense, and the subject of the sentence 
is the organization. 
• Keywords example: will, won’t, would, going to, schedule, plan, decide, 
determine, pledge (verb), arrange, introduce, reveal, intend, propose, 
choose, agree, disagree, etc. 
Actions 
• The message shows an organization’s actions and performance on 
economic, social, and environmental issues. 
• The message is often written in continuous tense, past tense, or perfect 
tense, and the subject of the sentence is the organization. 
• The message shows an organization’s activity with factual evidence, such 
as parties involved, time, location, contents of activities, quantitative 
measures 
• Keywords example: accomplish, achieve, implement, obtain, succeed, 
establish, reach, realize, acquire, collaborate, collaboration, partner, 
partnership, agreement, contract, donate, donation, volunteer, etc. 
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Appendix C. Guidelines on Coding Organized Hypocrisy Strategies (and Organizational Façades) - 
continued 
 
Organizational Façade Coding Guidelines 
Rational 
• It presents a façade that the management is running the firm in a rational 
manner with objectives to sustain firm’s growth, create opportunities, 
increase efficiencies, reduce costs, maximize revenues, profits, and 
shareholder values.  It highlights that managers consider any specific 
demand based on a cost and benefit assessment and ensure shareholders’ 
value is sustained. 
• Keywords example: growth, opportunity, risk, threat, efficiency, cost, 
benefit, profit, revenue, shareholder value, merger, acquisition, 
economy, economic, etc. 
Progressive 
• It presents a façade that the organization is tackling CSR issues and close 
gaps through continuous investments, carrying out researching activities, 
presenting research results at conferences, innovating new approaches, 
implementing state-of-the-art technologies, collaborating and forming 
partnerships with other organizations in developing new initiatives and 
programs (excluding volunteering and donation programs).  
• It also presents a façade that the organization is progressing, 
transforming, and evolving by showing future objectives and targets, 
changes undergoing over the past years, and targets achieved recently.  
• Keywords example: investment, research, innovation, technology, 
collaboration, partnership, initiative, programs, progress, change, 
transform, evolve, etc. 
Reputational 
• This façade displays firms’ ethical principles, codes of conduct, awards, 
quality of products and services. 
• It presents the organization in a positive manner which is often 
accompanied by symbols, stories, and attributes that can convince 
stakeholders that organizations are acting ethically. Being included in 
sustainability index and rankings and receiving awards in CSR areas can 
be considered as reputational symbols.  
• It also shows organization engagement in philanthropic activities such as 
volunteering activities, making donations, and sponsoring social- and 
environmental-related events. 
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Appendix D. Examples of Hypocrisy Strategies (and Façades) 
 
Strategies Example 
Organized hypocrisy  
 
Talk disclosure Happy World Environment Day today and every day! We're committed to 
fostering sustainable growth for our company, clients and in our 
communities. Learn more:  http://bddy.me/1ta6zmL #WED2016 
(Accenture, 5th June 2016) 
Decisions disclosure We're looking to a cleaner future after increasing our 2020 renewable 
energy goal by 33 percent. (Duke Energy, 21st June 2016) 
Actions disclosure Building on the legacy of its groundbreaking work in HIV/AIDS, the BMS 
Foundation is leveraging the HIV experience and infrastructure to create 
Global HOPE, pediatric hematology-oncology initiative in partnership 
with Texas Children's Hospital and BIPAI.  (Bristol-Myers Squibb, 21st 
February 2017)   
Organizational façades 
 
Rational façade Learn how we all can enjoy both a clean and safe environment and 
abundant and affordable energy: http://bit.ly/29ljQ68 (Kinder Morgan, 
26th September 2016) 
Progressive façade We're in the business of progress. See how we strive to create prosperity in 
the communities we call home. (Chevron, 6th June 2016) 
Reputational façade We're committed to diversity and inclusion for all and we're proud to 
celebrate the amazing LGBT community. (Bank of America, 17th June 
2016) 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
